Most CD/DVD burning software works with ISO images and its native images only.
#ANYTOISO LEGIT PLUS#
It can create ISO from almost everything including all CD/DVD/BD images formats popular in Internet (NRG, MDF, UIF, DMG, ISZ, BIN, DAA, PDI, CDI, IMG, etc), CD/ DVD/ Blue-ray disks or simply from a local folder.ĪnyToISO also can extract any of those formats plus ISO/ DEB/ RPM images. Artifacts AppleVersions.AnyToISO is the ultimate ISO Creator for Windows. Morphisec protects such environments without applying any sort of detection by executing Moving Target Defense against the same adversaries. Looking for suspicious memory patterns is not enough and will not hold for long, which makes prevention a clear necessity.ĬOVID-19 is the perfect time for adversaries to go hunt for new and less protected environments, WFH (work from home) is such an environment without a proper network protection stack, without proper hardening and without proper IT management and enforcement. Malware has become much more evasive without relation to its type or category. This evasiveness manifests itself through whitelisting bypass, fileless techniques and in-memory execution. Note : to access the folder you will need to disable hidden privileges (attrib -h -s). Note: the scheduled task is created with system privileges, you will need system privs to view it. Msimg32.dll creates a scheduled task for persistence, in most cases we have observed a GoogleUpdateTask that will execute every 15 minutes.The APSDaemon.exe new name starts with “ fb_” or “ rb_”, (“fb_.exe”).Both the directory name within the Speech/Engines and the APSDaemon.exe file name are randomized under given constraints Msimg32.dll writes a number of files that include the Apple push application and the malicious AppleVersions.dll to a “super” hidden directory under %windir%/SysWOW64/Speech/Engines/.Elevated Execution of a signed AnyToIso / CrystalBit application by the victim, which leads to a malicious msimg32.dll hijack (the malicious DLL is bundled together with the executable).
Downloading a software bundle from a fraudulent site (DVD plugins, browsers, Excel plugins, codecs, etc.).
What caught our attention is the use of similar techniques by abusing AnyToIso and CrystalBit software as part of the first delivery stage of the attack. In most cases, the deployment was part of a second stage of an attack and rarely have been seen as part of an infiltration stage. Over the course of more than a year, adversaries have deployed a legitimate and signed copy of the application together with a malicious AppleVersions.dll that is soon loaded by the daemon. The abuse of the Apple push notification executable (APSDaemon.exe) is certainly not new. During this attack, the adversary abuses two legitimate vendor applications, such as CrystalBit and Apple, as part of a dll double hijack attack chain that starts with a fraudulent software bundle and eventually leads to a persistent miner and in some cases spyware deployment. In this blog, we will technically dive into one significant attack campaign example that happened in the second week of May. In this vein, Morphisec Labs has seen a more than 800 percent increase in preventing attacks from adware and fraudulent software bundles among protected enterprises. This has included the evolution of adware, PUA, and fraudulent software bundle delivery beyond a consumer problem into a significant attack vector on enterprise employees.
As part of a rapid change in the work environment during the COVID-19 pandemic, Morphisec Labs has been tracking the change in the attack trend landscape.
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